The 2024 election will resemble the 2016 election, and not just because Democrats are again running a female candidate against Donald Trump. The parties’ candidates will also rely on similar coalitions to carry them to victory. Kamala Harris will count on some combination of minorities (with black women the strongest group), college graduates, the young, and residents of post-industrial metro centers. Trump will attract voters from states that specialize in resource extraction, small-town and rural voters, small-business owners, and white voters who haven’t graduated from college. Neither candidate will trot out an entirely new coalition.
Insofar as Hillary Clinton should have won in 2016 but was waylaid by a ridiculous scandal (which election eve intervention by the FBI revived) and by an unusually inept campaign that neglected battleground states, Democrats should be pleased by the resemblance between the two elections. But they may have two additional advantages: Harris may prove to be a better nominee than Clinton and run a better campaign; and Trump may prove to be a worse nominee than he was in 2016.
“Harris’s campaign … seems to have learned something from Clinton’s failures.”
Harris’s campaign, like Joe Biden’s in 2020, seems to have learned something from Clinton’s failures. Clinton ran a campaign based on appealing to specific identity groups. The Democratic convention in 2016 was centered around the premise that by electing Clinton, voters would “break the glass ceiling” that had prevented women from ascending to high office. Under an illusion fostered by Washington lobbies, it also sought to appeal to Hispanic and Latino voters by promoting citizenship for illegal immigrants, while ignoring the issue of border security.
By contrast, Harris, in her convention speech and in other appearances, has largely eschewed identity politics. While liberal commentators were crowing about how she was the first female “person of color” to be nominated for president, she issued no appeal of the kind to voters. Instead, her pitch was primarily directed toward putting the country above party and self. Harris has stressed unifying themes that Clinton ignored: nationalism and patriotism above all (including border security) and the need to transcend partisan division, which, however hopeless it may be, is the desire of the growing number of voters who identify themselves as “independents.” (Voters identifying as “independents” hit a record high of 51 percent in last June’s Gallup survey.)
Trump, however, is a far less effective campaigner than he was in 2016. He has built a strong following, but has lost much of his luster as an entertainer who could amuse and gain attention from those who disagree with his policies. He is embittered from his experience during his first term, and his bitterness spills over into his public appearances, such as his nomination speech at the Republican convention. Among many voters, he must answer for Jan. 6 and has made no effort to put it behind him. He isn’t mentally ill, as some partisan psychologists assert, but as Andrew Sullivan has put it, he is like one of Shakespeare’s mad, power-obsessed kings.
The Harris campaign has also avoided the pseudo-historical narrative of some liberal and left-wing commentators who insist that the United States today is in a political situation equivalent to those in interwar Italy or Germany, and that Trump is a fascist or even a neo-Nazi. Instead, it has focused on his egotism and corruption and on his putting his interests above the nation’s. I wouldn’t be surprised if Harris, like Biden in 2020, comes out the winner in their debate.
Harris will also benefit from two Supreme Court rulings. The Dobbs decision in 2022 overturning Roe v. Wade has made a major issue of Republicans’ opposition to abortion. In the past, some women voters ignored the GOP anti-abortion stance because they didn’t believe it would have any effect. But that is no longer the case. Fourteen states have already banned abortion. In addition, the court’s ruling against affirmative action last year in Students for Fair Admission will benefit Democrats by removing from debate an issue that has divided Asian-American and white voters from black voters. It allows Harris to promote equal opportunity, rather than equal outcomes.
Finally, Harris could benefit from changes to the composition of the electorate. White non-college voters, on whom Republican majorities have depended, have shrunk to 44 percent of the electorate in 2020, from 51 percent in 2000 and 46 percent in 2016. The Millennial and Gen-Z vote share, which began to tilt Democratic in 2004, grew to 31 percent in 2020, up from 23 percent in 2016; while the senior vote (those born 1925 to 1964), which trends Republican, has shrunk to 44 percent from 51 percent. In 2024, these figures will favor the Democrats even more.
If you look at a crucial swing state like Pennsylvania, you see similar trends. In the Pennsylvania Census, the share of residents who have college degrees has risen to nearly 40 percent in 2022, up from 34 percent in 2016, while the percentage of voters who are black or Hispanic has also risen. Demography doesn’t necessarily dictate political outcomes, but in the short run, existing trends are likely to hold up, and in 2024, these will put Harris in a better position than Clinton in 2016 or even Biden in 2020.
Trump, of course, has his own advantages. Inflation has always been a killer issue for incumbents. It doomed Jimmy Carter in 1980. Many voters identify Trump with pre-Covid prosperity. Voters worried about illegal immigration are also likely to favor Trump. Harris’s popularity could plummet among working-class male voters, including blacks and Hispanics, who prefer Trump’s image of strength to hers. And Harris could screw up in the debate or in a news conference—meaning she could fail to convince voters that she is “presidential.” But as of now, things are looking up for the Democratic nominee.