Of all the policy areas in which Donald Trump’s return to the White House will mark a dramatic shift, energy is arguably the most crucial for the nation’s prosperity and security. Trump campaigned on making America an energy powerhouse, and promised massively expanded oil and gas output and abundant electricity at rock-bottom prices. His call for US “energy dominance” is a sharp break from Biden’s “whole-of-government” climate agenda, which marshaled the full weight of the federal government’s myriad departments to accelerate a transition away from fossil fuels.
Such a shift is long overdue. The political and geostrategic importance of energy has come to the fore once again in recent years. The Ukraine war sped up an energy crisis that transformed America into Europe’s largest supplier of natural gas and shattered the received wisdom of “net zero” energy policy by revealing the inadequacy of renewables for powering developed countries’ economies. China, meanwhile, has redoubled its own energy efforts, planning to increase its nuclear-power fleet to around 300 reactors, or triple the size of the US fleet. At home, America finds its grid in a precarious condition just as the power-hungry computational enterprises spur demand for more juice.
“Getting energy policy right means getting the American future right.”
For these reasons, getting energy policy right means getting the American future right. So what do Trump and his incoming administration have in mind? Thus far, Trump and his nominees have shown the support for fossil fuels that we could expect to see in any Republican administration. However, this commitment doesn’t exclude support for alternatives. Doug Burgum, Trump’s pick for the Department of the Interior, and Chris Wright, his selection for the Department of Energy, are pragmatic energy maximalists who believe in man-made climate change. Both support expanding clean energy, but they balance that concern with urgent worries about grid reliability, a mounting challenge some of Biden’s appointees have also acknowledged. Trump’s picks could signal a new policy synthesis for the Republican Party, combining the standard deregulatory agenda with targeted dirigiste efforts to expand the energy supply and fortify the electrical grid.
Trump has never been shy about his support for America’s fossil-fuel industry. On election night, he dedicated a whole portion of his victory speech explaining that he wouldn’t let Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. anywhere near the oil industry. Trump’s picks for the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of the Interior, the two agencies that have the greatest impact on the upstream oil and gas industry, signal his continued commitments in this area.
Trump’s EPA pick, former New York Rep. Lee Zeldin, pledges to “restore US energy dominance, revitalize our auto industry to bring back American jobs, and make the US the global leader of AI.” But, he says he will do so “while protecting access to clean air and water.” Zeldin’s opening efforts will likely focus on rolling back Biden’s unpopular electric vehicle mandates and easing burdensome carbon regulations on gas and coal plants, which would have a positive impact on the grid (more on that below). Zeldin has his eye on keeping America competitive with China, which means tipping the scales away from climate concerns and toward the pursuit of “energy dominance.” If he pursues his mandate with enough fervor, litigation from the environmental movement can be expected. In fact, opposition to Zeldin may fortify groups like the Sierra Club, which has been reeling from budget shortfalls and labor issues.
Trump will enter office more constrained on oil and gas exploration than he’d wished. During the lame-duck, Biden decided to safeguard 625 million acres of the Pacific and the Atlantic from offshore drilling with little opportunity for revocation. Hence the importance of the president-elect’s choice of North Dakota Gov. Doug Burgum to lead the Department of the Interior, which handles oil and gas leases on federal land. Burgum will also serve as the chair of Trump’s National Council of Energy, where he can shape the rewriting of National Environmental Policy Act regulations. NEPA is something of a grim reaper for major infrastructure projects and a jobs program for environmental lawyers. It functions like a de facto tax on physical capital investments, signaling, in effect: You can build this as soon as all of the lawyers and consultants have been paid.
It isn’t clear that projects put through the NEPA process are better for the environment because it offers no material environmental protections and can even hinder environmental projects like forest management. The consequences of NEPA reform negotiations during the 2026 surface transport reauthorization (a must-pass package that requires 60 votes in the Senate) could be enormous, restoring America’s position as an industrial goliath.
Burgum, contrary to what Democrats might expect, is a pragmatist, not a fossil-fuel ideologue. He created North Dakota’s net-zero goals for 2030 and supports clean energy technologies like nuclear and geothermal. As some Democrats have begun to slowly, painfully shift away from a wind and solar-exclusive view of clean energy, Burgum might find surprising allies for his efforts. Another interesting wrinkle: Burgum is on record criticizing America’s car-centric urban layouts. How such commitments will play out is anyone’s guess, but collaboration with YIMBY Democrats concerned with bike lanes and walkability may be in the offing.
Republicans have developed a hostile relationship with the renewable energy industry. In part, this is because all politics is local. Rural districts generally swing red, and also bear the brunt of renewable energy buildouts. Between 2020 and 2024, rural rejections of renewable energy projects leapt from about 300 to 800. On the national debate stage, Republicans associate themselves with what they see as affordable and practical fossil fuels, whereas they view wind and solar as pricey, impractical, and aligned with the green NGOs that lobby Congress for subsidies—which go toward acquiring solar panels made in China, adding a geopolitical angle to the GOP’s antipathy. Unsurprisingly, then, some congressional Republicans have indicated their desire to eliminate the lavish tax credits the Inflation Reduction Act doles out.
The typical jockeying in DC will determine what fate will befall the credits. Some of these subsidies have brought jobs and investment into red districts, curbing House Republicans’ appetite for aggressive action. In addition, the well-funded and highly motivated green lobby for wind and solar is already pressing its case.
Wright, the Department of Energy pick, is an energy maximalist who boasts experience in both the solar and fracking industries. While he believes climate change is real, he avers that its threat to humanity pales in comparison to the ongoing horror of energy poverty. Despite his background in the shale revolution, he supports both nuclear and geothermal energy. His buffet-style approach to energy, while rare among partisans, hews more closely to the views of the average voter. Likely, he will de-emphasize the DOE’s support for wind and solar and shift the office’s support towards technologies he prefers.
The DOE has less impact on oil and gas than the DOI, but Wright could sign off on liquified natural gas export terminals that his predecessor, Jennifer Granholm, cautioned against. On nuclear energy, conversely, Wright may prove more aligned with the goals and policies of the outgoing administration. Under Biden, the DOE’s Loan Programs Office, helmed by Jigar Shah, put massive financial resources in the form of low-interest loans in favor of nuclear power investments, amounting to the strongest federal support for the industry since Eisenhower.
Despite this, Biden’s loan office pulled its punches, still covering its Obama-era black eye from the downfall of Solyndra, a renewable energy boondoggle that went belly up despite the office’s support. “Biden’s LPO had a very low risk tolerance,” Thomas Hochman, the Director of Infrastructure at the Foundation for American Innovation, told me. “This, along with an immense amount of bureaucracy and deference to progressive interest groups, made the office far less effective than it could be.” He went on: “Trump could rewrite the playbook by pumping bold, creative loans into industries like advanced geothermal, nuclear, and critical minerals.”
“Some worry that a potential nuclear renaissance may wither on the vine.”
Without such bold action, some worry that a potential nuclear renaissance may wither on the vine, causing America to surrender serious advantage to China, which offers 70 percent financing at 1 or 2 percent interest for nuclear plants based on an American design. “The LPO makes it possible for American capitalism to compete against China in crucial energy sectors, namely nuclear,” Mark Nelson, the Managing Director of Radiant Energy Group, said in an interview. “LPO programs properly directed would represent outstanding value for the taxpayer because power sources like nuclear unlock other vital industries,” he added.
As ever, Republicans are divided on this issue. Legacy think-tanks like Cato and Heritage oppose the LPO and worry that any government assistance will shift the nuclear industry’s priorities from building reactors to soaking up subsidies. Meanwhile, the GOP’s insurgent industrial policy-oriented wing as well as its China hawks tend to be in favor, but they lack a sharp energy vision. Plus, the GOP has struggled for years to field enough bodies to take full ideological command of the government. Therefore, the staffing advantage may redound to incumbent players within the Republican network who can populate positions within the DOE.
There’s also the fact that Wright’s own position on government investment in technologies like nuclear power isn’t altogether clear. Moreover, while Wright’s skills as an engineer, communicator, and entrepreneur can’t be doubted, running a major federal agency is another matter. And if not everyone employed at DOE feels inclined to sing from the same hymnal, serious challenges to his leadership may lay in wait.
This makes Trump’s Deputy Secretary of Energy pick, James Danly, all the more critical. Danly served as the chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in the first Trump administration and has been a consistent critic of the transition to renewable energy. Within the DOE, the Secretary functions like a CEO and the Deputy Secretary like a COO. Therefore, Danly and Wright will complement each other well, with Wright leveraging his executive abilities and Danly summoning his extensive government experience.
All of these issues converge on America’s increasingly fragile power grid. According to the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, electricity demand is expected to grow by 151 gigawatts over the next decade, but the country is facing over 115 gigawatts of retirements. Think of it as needing 75 Hoover Dams worth of new power, but losing almost 60 Hoover Dams instead. Nation-wide, more than 85 percent of the power generators getting added to the grid are wind and solar, which “lack key reliability elements” like dispatchability, i.e. they can’t turn on when you need them to. In short, America is experiencing a sharp increase in power demand even as its power supply shrivels. As a result, more than half of the country is at elevated risk of energy shortfalls. Trump is entering office at the precipice of a national electricity crisis.
How his administration’s various agencies tackle this crisis will determine America’s industrial and computational advantage. Achieving AI supremacy depends on winning the race for thermodynamic excellence. America will either have enough power to win or it won’t. To this end, a Zeldin-led EPA could improve grid security by easing Biden’s tough rules on power-plant emissions, which threaten to sap the country of much-needed coal and gas plants. Any gains the executive branch and Burgum can make on permitting reform could also improve the conditions for all kinds of power infrastructure. If the DOE can promote nuclear buildout while also boosting geothermal innovation, that would go a long way toward easing the crisis.
Then there’s the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which referees the power business. Under Biden, all of the commissioners warned that America was heading toward a reliability crisis, and even “climate justice”-oriented members like Willie Phillips and Allison Clements admitted that the continuing pace of retiring coal and gas plants is too rapid. Despite FERC’s agreement on the nature of the reliability crisis, under Biden, the Commission has continued to act beyond its remit in a way bound to compound the crisis.
One order rolled out by the Biden administration dictates a byzantine process for planning transmission lines, whereby FERC determines how utilities must plan to build and socialize the costs of new lines. Currently, renewable energy is bottlenecked in “interconnection queues” and waiting to be linked to the power system, a problem Order 1920 is intended to solve. But because all of this transmission is being built in response to artificial, subsidized demand, these lines are more like a Black Friday shopping-mall stampede for federal handouts than any sort of rational process intended to bring vital power supply to the grid.
“It’s safe to anticipate a further politicization of energy policy.”
This order may be vulnerable to legal challenge and it should not surprise anyone if Trump’s FERC gives it the axe. But that depends on who is leading the commission. Unlike other chairs of independent agencies, Biden’s FERC Chairman, Willie Phillips, has yet to announce his departure. Mark Christie is a Republican who initially argued that the order illegally exceeds the Commission’s authority, though he waffled on this after FERC expanded the role of states in the planning process. Lindsay See, the other Republican on the commission, is a recent addition who has yet to reveal her thinking on the major issues.
Regardless, it’s safe to anticipate a further politicization of energy policy as America strains to keep up with China. Some of this will proceed along familiar lines. Environmentalists will try to block new projects, and traditional conservatives will work to expand drilling while slashing subsidies and regulations. But the policies America needs require both well-targeted deregulation and state investments to stimulate production. Trump’s nominees offer some cause for optimism that such an approach will take shape in the coming years. Whether it does will determine a key part of his legacy.