Since Donald Trump’s re-election, the war in Ukraine has come to resemble a game of musical chairs. The Bidenites, scrambling to give Kiev whatever resources they can before the music stops on Jan. 20, have approved the use of two new weapons systems by the Ukrainian military. On Nov. 17, the White House announced its authorization for the use of US-supplied Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS, or “attack-ems”) to strike targets deep within Russian territory. Two days later, the administration approved the provision of anti-personnel landmines to Ukraine—in violation of both previous White House statements and anti-mine treaties ratified by Kiev.
While these policy reversals mark a substantial symbolic escalation of Washington’s role in the conflict, they will do little to alter the course of the war.
The use of ATACMS to destroy ammunition depots and disrupt supply lines within Russia’s borders has been avoided until now due to fears of retaliation by the Kremlin. Such retaliation would have little to do with the effectiveness of ATACMS on the battlefield: The maximum range is 190 miles, and Western states aren’t equipped to provide significant quantities of these weapons to the Ukrainians. Plus, the general expectation is that Russia will simply move vulnerable targets out of range of the missiles. The significance of ATACMS lies not in their results on the battlefield, but in the expertise required to use them.
The United States and its NATO allies have been careful to supply Ukraine with materiel while avoiding a direct confrontation with Russia and thus mitigating the risk of strategic weapons being deployed. NATO’s mutual-defense pact has served as a stabilizing force, deterring the Kremlin from targeting Ukraine’s allies and constraining those allies from direct involvement in the conflict. However, the introduction of long-range missiles has blurred the line between support and participation. Effective use of ATACMS requires skills that the Ukrainian military does not possess, ranging from the identification of targets to the actual deployment of the weapons systems themselves. Therefore, these weapons are most likely aimed and fired with significant help from Western personnel.
The Russian response to this escalation has telegraphed a message. Days after President Biden’s approval of the use of ATACMS, Russia launched a new intermediate-range ballistic missile, called the “Oreshnik,” at a Ukrainian military facility in Dnipro. The use of nuclear-capable, longer-range missiles armed with conventional warheads would be an incredibly inefficient use of resources if Russia’s intentions were restricted to the direct destruction of Ukrainian forces. However, the costliness of using such weapons lends credence to the message that Vladimir Putin appears to be communicating: Not only does the Russian state have the capabilities to use nuclear weapons against faraway NATO members, but it is also willing to use those weapons should Western escalation continue. Such threats shouldn’t be taken lightly.
Yet despite this “delicate balance of terror,” as a seminal RAND report put it, it is unlikely that the current escalation will lead to nuclear war. This isn’t due to any lack of resolve on Putin’s part. Instead, Biden’s escalation could only be pursued under the assumption of a “rational” Putin. Put another way: The Russian strongman is operating under the assumption that American support for bloodletting in Europe will cease with the second inauguration of Donald Trump. It would therefore be foolish for Putin to throw away the expectation of a negotiated settlement in favor of mutually assured destruction: Any escalation instigated by the Biden administration is strictly bound to a two-month timeline, after which American support for Ukraine is likely to significantly diminish.
While pro-Ukraine die-hards will be displeased by this, those who take the risk of nuclear escalation seriously can breathe a sigh of relief: The assurance of a Trump presidency has already dampened the likelihood of an escalatory spiral speeding up the Revelation times.
“He will leave the world worse than he found it.”
Does this mean that Biden’s escalation is harmless? Absolutely not. While retaliation is unlikely to result in World War III, the frantic scramble for a conventional advantage will continue to exacerbate conditions on the ground. Expecting abandonment by its patrons, the Ukrainian military will use every resource at its disposal to improve its bargaining position with Russia. For their part, the Russians have an incentive to stall for as long as possible, responding with conventional weapons while allowing Ukraine to exhaust its destructive capabilities before negotiating. These ingredients combine to produce increasingly destructive violence on the ground without any corresponding benefit in a potential settlement. In short, Biden’s escalation exchanges Ukrainian lives and American treasure for the possibility of marginal territorial gains—gains that may not even be achievable.
Biden’s lame-duck escalation cements his legacy as an ineffectual hawk. Bound by the commitments of his predecessor, his first major foreign-policy action was the botched withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan in 2021—a laudable goal with flawed execution. The following year saw the invasion of Ukraine, while 2023 brought the conflagration in the Levant. Biden’s foreign-policy legacy begins with handing over American weaponry to the Taliban and will end with the placement of landmines in Europe. When he steps down in January, he will leave the world worse than he found it, from Kabul to Kiev.