Throughout his career, Marco Rubio has been a harsh critic of left-wing governments in Latin America, and has supported US-backed regime change attempts against some of them. But as Donald Trump’s newly appointed secretary of state, he has shown some early pragmatism, reflecting a focus on advancing concrete American interests rather than grand ideological crusades.
Rubio’s first foreign tour, taking in several countries in the Caribbean Basin, resulted in a number of major diplomatic wins, especially on immigration. Rubio’s most impressive achievement came in Guatemala, where President Bernardo Arévalo agreed to a 40 percent increase in repatriation flights of deportees. In exchange, Rubio announced that the US Army Corps of Engineers would support the construction of port infrastructure and a metro system. Rubio also issued a USAID waiver for anti-drug funding.
The pragmatic posture taken by Rubio toward the progressive Arévalo—whose father, former President Juan José Arévalo, was forced into exile by a 1954 CIA-backed coup—is the latest indication that the former Florida senator is evolving away from the hard-line neoconservatism of his earlier career. During Trump’s first term, then-Sen. Rubio acquiesced to a Heritage Foundation lobbying effort on behalf of Arévalo’s corrupt predecessors to dismantle a UN-sponsored anti-corruption commission in Guatemala. But when, in the 2023 presidential election, Attorney General Consuelo Porras attempted to annul Arévalo’s victory, Rubio condemned the attempt. He also declined to meet with Porras (who remains in office) during his visit. His evolving position may be driven by a legitimate concern that failing to back Arévalo—who still runs a risk of being driven out of office—would destabilize Guatemala, leading to further emigration to the United States.
Rubio also showed deftness in Panama, whose leadership was blindsided by Trump’s threats to annex the Panama Canal because of worries regarding Chinese influence over the waterway. There are no Chinese troops in the canal, but there is a case to be made that the Middle Kingdom controls the largest ports on either end of it via a Hong Kong-based company, CK Hutchison Holdings.
During Rubio’s visit, Panama made two concessions to US pressure, agreeing to audit CK Hutchinson’s port concessions and pull out of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The country also reaffirmed its commitment to a crackdown on northward migration across its territory, with Rubio and President José Raúl Mulino observing a repatriation flight of Colombian migrants. On immigration especially, the Panamanian president is ardently pro-Washington. During his 2024 campaign, Mulino went so far as to call Panama the United States’s “other border.” After taking office, he went on to reduce crossings by 41 percent prior to Trump’s inauguration.
Mulino has said control over the canal is Panama’s only red line with Washington, making Trump’s threats to seize it all the more alienating. Further friction was introduced when Trump proclaimed that American warships could now travel “free of charge” through the canal—a claim quickly refuted by an irate Mulino. To Rubio’s credit, he evidently assuaged Panamanian concerns over control of the canal, with Mulino praising his statesmanship.
In El Salvador, President Nayib Bukele agreed to take in non-Salvadoran violent deportees in exchange for a fee. The benefits for both countries of such an agreement seem clear—enough so that the White House seems willing to overlook Bukele’s connections with both the Chinese and Venezuelan regimes. At the same time, it’s worth recalling that the gangs that previously wreaked havoc in El Salvador were largely a prison phenomenon that first arrived in the country via deportation from the United States. Should Bukele’s autocratic rule over El Salvador—and its prisons—ever falter, that pattern could be repeated.
Laudable as his recent wins may be, the secretary shouldn’t shy away from engaging leaders to the left of Arévalo. Tellingly, Mexico and Honduras—both countries with left-wing heads of state—weren’t included in Rubio’s itinerary. Yet, like Arévalo, Mexico’s Claudia Sheinbaum has shown ample willingness to pursue good relations with Trump despite his threat of tariffs. The secretary could, for instance, reciprocate by committing material support to the completion of Mexico’s interoceanic and Maya trains. Sheinbaum and Arévalo have expressed hopes to expand the latter into Guatemala, creating jobs and boosting tourism, while the former would help alleviate the increasingly overburdened Panama Canal. It also speaks volumes that the two progressive leaders have prioritized material development as a means of deterring emigration.
Similarly, Rubio should look to smooth over tensions with Honduran President Xiomara Castro over deportations ahead of a pivotal election in November. Back in 2017, the Trump administration backed the fraudulent election of Juan Orlando Hernández, who was later convicted of drug trafficking in a US court. While the Castro administration has since suffered its own narco scandals, the State Department should aim to reduce instability in Honduras by ensuring the will of voters is respected this time.
“Rubio’s well-known hawkish views may give him more room to advocate for a pragmatic policy.”
Rubio also has a chance to build on the practical diplomacy the administration has displayed in persuading Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro to accept repatriation flights. Sanctions relief could coax Nicaragua into accepting deportees and restoring visa requirements for Cuban nationals, thereby cutting off a travel pipeline that facilitates mass migration into the United States. Trump and Rubio could also cut a deal with Havana to release political prisoners in exchange for rescinding Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism—a driver of the island’s migratory crisis.
The secretary would also do well to note that leftist leaders including Sheinbaum, Colombia’s Gustavo Petro, and Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva are of one mind with Trump with regard to the war in Ukraine. Lula in particular has been a key leader among non-aligned countries favoring a negotiated solution to the conflict; even Petro has expressed a willingness to engage Trump on the issue despite a recent spat. The White House could use such an opening to pursue a deal with Brazil to tighten visa requirements for would-be migrants to the Darien Gap in exchange for exemption from tariffs on Brazilian steel.
Rubio’s well-known hawkish views may give him more room to advocate for a pragmatic policy. On the subject of Mexico’s cartels, he has thankfully stated that he prefers cooperation with the Mexican government over the dropping of bombs—in marked contrast to other GOP hard-liners. The latter would do well to realize that heavy-handed US intervention in the region’s affairs has often propelled migrants north, while also empowering autocratic anti-American regimes. But even if the rest of the GOP doesn’t acknowledge these realities, the material results from Rubio’s first days offer cause for optimism for his tenure in the State Department.