Presidential elections rarely turn on foreign-policy issues, and 2024 is likely to be no exception. But while the US role abroad may not be on the minds of most voters, nations around the globe have their eyes trained on November, anxiously gauging how the election outcome might affect their future. Nowhere is there more uncertainty than in Taiwan.
The Democratic Party’s 2024 platform suggests a degree of continuity with the past, promising—as in 2020—a commitment to the Strait status quo across the Taiwan Strait. But there is significant disagreement among conservatives about how to approach Taiwan. In a July 2024 interview, Donald Trump seemed to question the wisdom of committing to a military defense of the island, citing the difficulty of defending it and puzzling over the US interests at stake. “I think Taiwan should pay us for defense,” Trump said. “You know, we’re no different than an insurance company.”
Others in the GOP have criticized this view as dangerous isolationism. Former Vice President Mike Pence and Heritage Foundation founder Ed Feulner, for example, spoke for many conservatives when they argued in The Washington Post that “the United States must stand firm in its support for Taiwan … because it is in our national interest to do so.” Another faction, led by Elbridge Colby, whose name has been floated for a high-level national-security position in a second Trump administration, has also pressed for a defense of Taiwan but acknowledges that US interests in the island’s fate are less than existential.
But Trump is right. Washington policymakers across the partisan spectrum ought to be much more circumspect about making explicit or even halting commitments to Taiwan, regardless of the political pressure. An American attempt to protect Taiwan from a Chinese invasion would be immensely expensive—militarily and economically—but the US stakes and chances for success are rather limited. Worse, defending Taiwan might harm, more than help, America’s national security and vital interests. Under these circumstances, a reluctance to commit to defend Taiwan isn’t isolationist but simply prudent.
“The price tag on a US defense of Taiwan would be astronomical.”
The price tag on a US defense of Taiwan would be astronomical. In addition to global economic costs on the order of $10 trillion, the military expenses of a war with China would be staggering, possibly adding trillions of dollars more. A “good” military outcome for the United States would likely involve the loss of several aircraft carriers, dozens of large surface ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of servicemembers—all before the war shifts into what is likely a drawn-out stalemate.
But as Trump alluded to in his July interview, even after massive military investments, the United States might still find itself on the losing end of a war over Taiwan. Situated fewer than 100 miles away from the island, the People’s Republic would have significant military advantages over the United States. Most notably, Beijing could use its large arsenal of long-range missiles to keep US ships and aircraft well outside the first island chain, too far away to contribute meaningfully.
The United States could try to use long-range missiles fired by bombers or from ground locations in Japan—if permitted—to thwart China’s invasion. But America’s own missile stockpile is likely too small to prevent China’s invasion fleet, powered by the country’s 400 ship navy, from reaching Taiwan’s shores and blockading the island.
Nor would the costs and risks to US security end when the fighting stops. Win or lose, military spending would stay high as the United States rushes to rebuild its arsenal in the face of a more uncertain international security environment. Washington would likely be less well-equipped to respond to crises in other theaters, having expended its stockpiles and burned through military hardware in the Western Pacific. Americans might find their standing in Asia also diminished.
These costs might be justified if vital interests were at stake, but as Trump and even Colby acknowledge, Taiwan’s strategic value to the United States is far from existential. A potential Chinese seizure of the island would have only modest economic and military implications for the United States. Militarily, China would benefit from basing long-range missiles and air-defense systems on Taiwan and harboring its submarines in the deep-water ports on Taiwan’s eastern coast, making them harder to track. Both advantages would moderately extend the reach and precision of China’s anti-access capabilities and could complicate US operations in the Western Pacific. But with the right investments in air defense, its own long-range strike capabilities, and infrastructure along the second island chain, the United States could counter those gains.
Moreover, a successful Chinese takeover of Taiwan would do little to shift the balance of military power in the region. Control of Taiwan wouldn’t improve the Middle Kingdom’s position for further military expansion into places like Japan or the Philippines, and would likely trigger rapid military investments across the region to balance against further aggression from Beijing.
The economic implications of a Chinese seizure of Taiwan would be similarly manageable. Many fear that control of Taiwan would give China a chokehold over the production and sale of the most advanced semiconductors manufactured by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. While an invasion would disrupt the island’s semiconductor production, Western firms who supply TSMC with key inputs believe they could protect their intellectual property from falling into Chinese hands. Semiconductors, it’s worth remembering, don’t grow on a special tree indigenous to the island.
A bigger concern is the lost US access to TSMC’s semiconductors and the implications it would have for American growth. However, Washington is also already investing at home and diversifying its supply chains to mitigate this risk and will produce almost 30 percent of the most advanced chips domestically by 2032. Older generation chips would likely suffice for many purposes, and the United States could start building stockpiles of more advanced semiconductors to further reduce risk.
Perhaps most important, while the US stakes are low, China’s are high. Trump has said that Taiwan is the “apple of [Xi Jingping’s] eye.” Reunification with Taiwan is a vital Chinese interest. Taiwan simply matters more to Beijing than to Washington, and this may redound to the great advantage of the People’s Republic.
Facing the prospect of a military campaign that is high-risk and high-cost but in which the American stakes are low, policymakers should be allergic to even tentative commitments—let alone a shift to “strategic clarity”—that could pull the United States into a self-defeating war. Those who favor a more interventionist approach may argue that a failure to back Taiwan amounts to an abrogation of the long-standing US commitment to the island. But those commitments were made under very different circumstances than today, when the US military strength far surpassed any threat from mainland China. It is rational self-interest—aligned with America’s founding traditions—for such age-old entanglements to be re-evaluated and updated based upon new conditions.
As presidential campaigning continues, Trump and Kamala Harris will face pressure from Taiwan’s backers at home and abroad to make commitments that signal American resolve. Neither should take the bait.